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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects of the recent Economic Crisis on individual preferences 
for redistribution in 23 European countries. After implementing a decomposition of the 
variation in these preferences, it is showed that the crisis was highly significant in 
increasing support for redistribution. It is found that more unemployment and, in 
particular, youth unemployment has considerably raised the citizens’ demand for 
redistribution. 
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1. Introduction 
The relevance of studying preferences for redistribution is rooted in the voting model by 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) which shows that the median voter is decisive in regard to 
pushing for redistribution when income inequality increases. More sophisticated approaches 
introduce other important variables such as upward mobility expectations of low-income 
individuals (Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Ok, 2001), beliefs on individual effort and luck as 
being responsible for income formation (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) and informational 
limitations on inequality levels and the influence of reference groups (Kusiemko et al., 2013; 
Cruces et al., 2013 and Schokkaert and Truyts, 2014). All these efforts advance the original 
median voter model, yet at the same time they offer conflicting results. A number of studies 
have empirically assessed the determinants of preferences for redistribution relying mostly on 
surveys including questions about perceptions and values on redistribution and inequality. 
Some examples are Georgiadis and Manning (2012); Pittau et al. (2013); Kerr (2014), 
Alesina and Giuliano (2011); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Luttmer and Singhal (2011); 
Guillaud (2013) and Corneo and Grüner (2002). Although all these works, and related ones, 
are important in the literature of preferences for redistribution, they do not address the effects 
of a major economic event, namely, the 2008/09 financial crisis. An exception is Margalit 
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(2013) who analyses the effect of the Great Recession in the American preferences for 
redistribution. 
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of the recent economic crisis on preferences 
for redistribution in a broader set of countries, particularly in Europe. For this purpose, we 
use two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) carried out in 2008 and 2010, which 
comprises 23 countries and 69,621 individuals with non-missing data. The support for 
redistribution increased in a total of 19 countries during the analysed period. A Oaxaca 
decomposition allows us to further explore this variation. Interestingly, our baseline model –
which includes most of the usual covariates considered in the empirical literature- reports that 
the differences in endowments between individuals can only explain about 10% of the rise in 
redistributive preferences. But, once a variable closely related with the economic crisis 
(monthly unemployment rate) is introduced, the model is able to explain 55% of the rise of 
preferences for redistribution. This suggests that the economic crisis has effects not only on 
economic indicators but also on social preferences, even after controlling by variables related 
to economic self-interest and many other covariates. In addition, a model including youth 
unemployment rates can further explain about 70% of the variation in preferences for 
redistribution. It seems that youth unemployment captures more fully, and sadly, the drastic 
effects of the crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the data. The third section 
discusses the estimation and decomposition methods. The fourth section reports the results. 
Finally, section 5 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Data 
We use the waves of 2008 and 2010 of the European Social Survey (ESS). The aim of the 
ESS is to measure attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviour patterns of individuals in Europe. 
The key question measuring individual preferences for redistribution is “To what extent you 
agree or disagree with the statement: the government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels”. The individual must choose one of five alternatives, which we 
rescale in the following way: strongly agree (5); agree (4); neither agree nor disagree (3); 
disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1). Therefore, the higher this number, the more in favour 
for redistribution. Gini indexes are selected from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID version 4.0, September 2013) (see Solt, 2009 for details) because this data 
–although not without its problems– provides the broadest coverage across countries and over 
time. The macroeconomic variable related to the economic crisis is the monthly 
unemployment rate from Eurostat. The sample is composed of 23 countries observed in 2008 
and 2010, and includes 69,621 observations with non-missing data. 
The simple average of the country means of preferences for redistribution are 3.83 and 
3.92 (in a scale from 1 to 5) in 2008 and 2010, respectively; though there is a large disparity 
among countries (see Figure 1). For example, in 2008 the countries with the highest and 
lowest scores are Greece with 4.42, and Denmark with 3.10. Between both years, each 
country experienced an increase in the average score of preferences for redistribution except 
Greece, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Six countries report an increase larger than 5% 
(Portugal, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovakia and Czech Republic). Moreover, a simple 
test of unconditional means reveals that the variation in preferences for redistribution is 
statistically significant at 95% of confidence in 15 out of 23 countries between 2008 and 
2010. The unconditional change is not significant in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and UK. 
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Figure 1. Preferences for redistribution by country, 2008 and 2010 
 
 
  Source: ESS, author’s elaboration 
  
Figure 2. Unemployment rates in European countries (2007-2012) 
        
 
 
     Source: Eurostat. Author’s elaboration. 
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The choice of monthly unemployment rates as the proxy for the economic crisis is based, 
firstly, on its ease to be perceived by the individuals through the media, public debates and 
labour market experiences; and secondly, we want to take advantage of different interview 
dates within and between countries in order to capture the sharp movements, caused by the 
crisis, in the unemployment rates. Figure 2 shows that, in general, unemployment has rapidly 
increased from the end of 2008 or beginning of 2009 in the majority of European countries, 
although the levels of unemployment rates show a large variation among countries. The 
countries plotted in the last panel of Figure 2 report the highest unemployment rates 
experienced during 2010, which are precisely the economies more severely affected by the 
economic crisis. 
 
 
3. Methods 
We first explore the determinants of preferences for redistribution with an OLS specification1 
where the dependent variable, as previously described, is the score of preference for 
redistribution that ranges from low preference (1) to high preference (5). The estimations use 
the following specification: 
,,    	  
,,  ,  ,,  ,,                           (1) 
The subscripts i, c and t stand for individual, country and year, respectively. The model 
includes  and 	 to control for country and year fixed effects. In particular, 	 refers to the 
effect of year 2010. The inclusion of these variables is standard in the measure of preferences 
for redistribution with pooled datasets (Kerr, 2014; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). The value of the Gini index is lagged one year 
and varies across country and year. The country unemployment rate correspond to the month 
 in which the individual was surveyed. ,, is the error term. Vector ,, includes 
individual controls regularly employed in the empirical literature of redistributive 
preferences. Apart from demographic variables, this vector includes a dummy variable that 
indicates if the individual is part of a minority ethnic group in the country, self-declared 
religiosity in a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very religious), a dummy for union affiliation, a 
self-declared political position from 0 (left) to 10 (right), a dummy indicating if the 
respondent has or had own children and the number of hours the individual watches 
television (news or programmes about politics and current affairs) in an average weekday. 
The ESS does not have a uniform question on personal income, but we include a proxy that is 
asked in each wave2. This is “which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you 
feel about your household’s income nowadays?” with four possible scales: living comfortably 
on present income (1), coping on present income (2), difficult on present income (3) and very 
difficult on present income (4). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 In the empirical literature of preferences for redistribution it is a common practice to use the multi-scale 
variable about preferences for redistribution and estimate with OLS. Examples of this are Georgiadis and 
Manning (2012), Kerr (2014), Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Luttmer and Singhal (2011). All of them argue 
that the use of alternative modelling approaches such as the ordered logit model do not change the results.  
2
 The ESS includes a question that indicates which range of total household income the individual belongs to, 
but a high percentage of individuals do not answer this question in our sample (23%). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable 
2008   2010   Total 
mean sd   mean sd   mean sd 
in favour of redistribution 3.82 1.04   3.90 1.05   3.86 1.05 
male 0.49 0.50   0.48 0.50   0.48 0.50 
living with partner 0.67 0.47   0.66 0.47   0.67 0.47 
age 47.85 16.85   48.63 17.11   48.24 16.99 
isced: 1 0.11 0.32   0.12 0.32   0.11 0.32 
isced: 2 0.16 0.37   0.14 0.35   0.15 0.36 
isced: 3 0.41 0.49   0.41 0.49   0.41 0.49 
isced: 4 0.03 0.16   0.05 0.22   0.04 0.19 
isced: 5 0.29 0.45   0.28 0.45   0.28 0.45 
isced: other 0.00 0.02   0.00 0.05   0.00 0.04 
ethnic 0.05 0.21   0.05 0.21   0.05 0.21 
religious 4.68 2.93   4.60 2.94   4.64 2.93 
income: living comfortably 0.29 0.45   0.27 0.44   0.28 0.45 
income: coping on 0.47 0.50   0.45 0.50   0.46 0.50 
income: difficult on 0.18 0.39   0.19 0.39   0.19 0.39 
income: very difficult on 0.06 0.23   0.08 0.28   0.07 0.26 
union 0.46 0.50   0.44 0.50   0.45 0.50 
retired 0.24 0.42   0.26 0.44   0.25 0.43 
unemployed 0.06 0.24   0.08 0.27   0.07 0.26 
lef-right political scale 5.10 2.17   5.18 2.16   5.14 2.17 
have children 0.70 0.46   0.72 0.45   0.71 0.45 
time watching tv 0.79 0.77   0.79 0.77   0.79 0.77 
gini net incomes 28.59 3.67   28.88 3.68   28.74 3.68 
gini market incomes 41.89 5.67   41.96 5.34   41.92 5.51 
monthly unemployment rate 6.75 2.43   10.11 4.02   8.43 3.72 
N 33600     34980     67428   
 
One way to explore changes over time with the available data (cross-sections before and 
after the crisis in each country) is by implementing a decomposition approach. Although the 
aim is different in this paper, Georgiadis and Manning (2012) have also performed a 
decomposition technique with cross-sections of different years in the UK to study changes in 
inequality and support for redistribution. We will carry-out a Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 
1973).  The idea is that a regression similar to equation 1 is estimated for each year.  We can 
then use this to disentangle the effects in the variation of support for redistribution due to 
differences in the means of the covariates and differences in the estimated slopes. Provided 
that      and    , where  ! and  ! refer to the set of estimated 
coefficients and the average values of the included covariates in each year, it is possible to 
obtain the following expression: 
 "   #  "  $   % " &                                    (2) 
Equation 2 indicates that the changes experienced in preferences for redistribution can be 
discomposed in a first part due to differences in characteristics and in a second part due to 
differences in coefficients. Generally, the first part is regarded as the explained part due to 
differences in the predictors, while the second is the unexplained part. This latter component 
is commonly attributed to discrimination in labour market studies, but also includes possible 
effects of unobserved variables. Although the choice of the reference period (year 2008 or 
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2010) is an important issue with expression 2, the results should be very similar. The idea is 
to choose a meaningful counterfactual for the decomposition effects, which in the end will be 
an arbitrary choice. Instead, we will implement a decomposition using a pooled model as the 
reference, which is advised in Jann (2008). In this case, the reference category are the 
parameters estimated with a pooled model of both years. 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for equation 1. The first column considers the Gini 
coefficient computed with income after taxes and transfers (Gini net), while column 2 
includes the Gini computed with pre-tax and pre-transfers income (Gini market). Then, 
columns 3 and 4 add the country unemployment rate corresponding to the month the 
individual was surveyed.  
 
Table 2. OLS estimates for preferences for redistribution 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
male -0.1092*** (0.0083) -0.1093*** (0.0083) -0.1088*** (0.0083) -0.1089*** (0.0083) 
living with partner -0.0182* (0.0096) -0.0179* (0.0096) -0.0177* (0.0096) -0.0175* (0.0096) 
age 0.0065*** (0.0016) 0.0066*** (0.0016) 0.0066*** (0.0016) 0.0066*** (0.0016) 
age sq /100 -0.0040** (0.0016) -0.0041** (0.0016) -0.0041** (0.0016) -0.0041** (0.0016) 
education level: isced 2 0.0522*** (0.0158) 0.0524*** (0.0158) 0.0524*** (0.0158) 0.0526*** (0.0158) 
education level: isced 3 0.0311** (0.0150) 0.0314** (0.0150) 0.0305** (0.0150) 0.0307** (0.0150) 
education level: isced 4 -0.0099 (0.0246) -0.0123 (0.0246) -0.0130 (0.0246) -0.0147 (0.0246) 
education level: isced 5 -0.1945*** (0.0159) -0.1942*** (0.0159) -0.1947*** (0.0159) -0.1945*** (0.0159) 
education level: isced 6 -0.1398 (0.1249) -0.1386 (0.1251) -0.1357 (0.1252) -0.1349 (0.1253) 
ethnic 0.0488** (0.0197) 0.0486** (0.0197) 0.0493** (0.0197) 0.0491** (0.0197) 
religious 0.0054*** (0.0016) 0.0054*** (0.0016) 0.0055*** (0.0016) 0.0055*** (0.0016) 
income nowadays: living comfort. -0.4548*** (0.0190) -0.4543*** (0.0190) -0.4527*** (0.0190) -0.4524*** (0.0190) 
income nowadays: coping on -0.2552*** (0.0165) -0.2546*** (0.0165) -0.2531*** (0.0165) -0.2527*** (0.0165) 
income nowadays: difficult on -0.1062*** (0.0167) -0.1058*** (0.0167) -0.1040*** (0.0167) -0.1037*** (0.0167) 
union 0.0989*** (0.0096) 0.0990*** (0.0096) 0.0989*** (0.0096) 0.0990*** (0.0096) 
retired 0.0582*** (0.0145) 0.0582*** (0.0145) 0.0585*** (0.0145) 0.0585*** (0.0145) 
unemployed 0.0530*** (0.0162) 0.0530*** (0.0162) 0.0525*** (0.0162) 0.0525*** (0.0162) 
left-right political scale -0.0816*** (0.0020) -0.0816*** (0.0020) -0.0815*** (0.0020) -0.0815*** (0.0020) 
have children -0.0128 (0.0113) -0.0134 (0.0113) -0.0131 (0.0113) -0.0136 (0.0113) 
watching tv 0.0220*** (0.0057) 0.0220*** (0.0057) 0.0221*** (0.0057) 0.0220*** (0.0057) 
year2010 0.0734*** (0.0083) 0.0707*** (0.0082) 0.0355*** (0.0124) 0.0353*** (0.0123) 
gini net 0.0091 (0.0082)     0.0067 (0.0082)     
gini market     0.0165*** (0.0057)     0.0138** (0.0057) 
monthly unemployment rate         0.0115*** (0.0028) 0.0108*** (0.0028) 
constant 4.033*** (16.97) 3.603*** (14.93) 4.020*** (16.91) 3.639*** (15.09) 
Observations 67428   67428   67428   67428   
Adjusted R2 0.167   0.167   0.167   0.167   
***p<0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable indicates more support for redistribution 
(from 1 to 5). Each regression includes country fixed effects.  The reference variable for income is "income nowadays: very difficult on"; 
and for education level is isced 1 (primary education). In left-right scale, 0 is most in the left and 10 is most in the right. 
 
The regression results are in line with what is commonly found in the empirical literature. 
Income inequality is positively associated with the demand for redistribution when this is 
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measured with market incomes. This result also holds in Olivera (2012) who uses the ESS 
data and global measures of inequality. Furthermore, members of a minority ethnic group, 
poorer, unemployed, retired and union members are more in favour of redistribution. The 
same applies for individuals who are religious or more leftists. Given that these two last 
variables are ordinal, we check that replacing their values for dummies practically does not 
change the results. The exposure to political news or programmes about politics and current 
affairs in television is also positively related with preferences for redistribution, which lend 
support to the positive effects of informational disclosure on the demand for redistribution 
(e.g. Cruces et al., 2013). Interestingly, the dummy variable for year 2010 is positive and 
significant in all models. Given that the economic crisis is the major event that occurred 
between 2008 and 2010, it can be hypothesized that, at least partially, this is what the dummy 
year is capturing. The addition of the monthly unemployment rate is aimed at more precisely 
capturing the effects of the crisis, and indeed, this is what we can imply from the regression 
results. Unemployment is statistically significant and positively associated with preferences 
for redistribution, in addition a reduction in the size of the year dummy coefficient is also 
observed. The year variable is still significant after the introduction of unemployment, which 
can indicate that some other aspects related to the economic crisis cannot be entirely captured 
with unemployment rates. 
Table 3 reports the decomposition of the variation in the support for redistribution between 
2008 and 2010. A model that includes the Gini computed with net incomes can explain only 
8% of the variation in preferences for redistribution, while the one that includes the Gini 
computed with market incomes explains 12%. These results indicate that changes in 
individual characteristics and overall income inequality are not sufficient to explain the shift 
in the redistributive preferences between both periods. In other words, there are other effects 
that are being neglected by the baseline models. Notably, once we add the monthly 
unemployment rate to the set of covariates, the model is able to explain 56% of the variation 
in the preferences. This result suggests that the economic crisis has played an important role 
not only in obvious economic indicators, but also in affecting social preferences. A final 
model includes the youth unemployment rate instead of the total unemployment rate, and is 
able to explain 69% of the variation in preferences for redistribution. Although not reported 
here, youth unemployment have sharply increased during the crisis, reaching rates larger than 
25% in 2010 in eight countries of our country sample. This indicator has more than doubled 
between 2008 and 2010 in the Baltic countries, Spain and Ireland. It seems that youth 
unemployment captures more fully, and sadly, the drastic effects of the crisis.  
As a first robust check, we implement a decomposition with a dependent variable that 
takes value 1 if the individual strongly agrees with the statement “the government should take 
measures to reduce differences in income levels”, and 0 otherwise. The baseline model only 
explains 14%-16% of the variation in preferences for redistribution, but the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate can explain 60%. The use of youth unemployment rates further increases 
this figure to 62%. So, these results are very similar to our main specification. As a second 
check, we remove the category “neither agree nor disagree” from the dependent variable as 
some can argue that this level may be regarded as “I don’t know”. Even in this case, the 
inclusion of unemployment and youth unemployment rates improve the explanation of 
preferences for redistribution to 47% and 60%, respectively. A final check is related to the 
ordinal nature of the religiosity and political self-placement variables. We detect that the use 
of dummies for these variables can improve the contribution of the unemployment and youth 
unemployment rates in explaining preferences for redistribution to 54% and 67%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3. Oaxaca decomposition of changes in preferences for redistribution 2010/2008 
  coeff s.e. 
Prediction 2010 3.893 0.006 
Prediction 2008 3.812 0.006 
Difference 0.081 0.009 
Model with gini net     
    Explained 0.008 0.004 
    Unexplained 0.073 0.008 
Model with gini market     
    Explained 0.011 0.004 
    Unexplained 0.070 0.008 
Model with gini market & unemployment     
    Explained 0.044 0.010 
    Unexplained 0.037 0.012 
Model with gini market & youth unemployment     
    Explained 0.057 0.010 
    Unexplained 0.024 0.012 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has shown that the economic crisis has substantially influenced the support for 
redistribution in a number of European countries. The evidence suggests that more 
unemployment and, in particular, youth unemployment has increased the citizens’ demand 
for redistribution. In a time of economic turmoil governments will find it difficult to satisfy 
such demands given the declines in production and tax revenues on the one hand, and 
increasing fiscal debt on the other hand. This in turn, will create more tensions and will 
further demoralize individuals since they count on more redistribution for economic relief.  
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